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COMMENT
One Giant Heap for Mankind: The Need for
National Legislation or Agency Action
to Regulate Private Sector Contributions
to Orbital Debris
CHARLES MOTTIER

I.

INTRODUCTION

Space exploration and utilization has been a steady and
permanent industry ever since the launch of Sputnik I in 1957.1
The development of space soon after that launch was based
primarily on defense necessity and competition in connection with
the Cold War.2 This competition led to the realization that space
could have many uses other than simply a forum for semi-passive
With
saber-rattling and defense systems experimentation.3
increased use, the value of Earth’s orbit as a locus for
communications and peaceful scientific experimentation has
become readily apparent to developed countries.4 In the late
1950s a total of twenty-one objects were successfully launched
from Earth, but by the end of the Cold War, a space launch

1.Space Launch Totals by Decade, SPACE LAUNCH REPORT,
http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/logdec.html#1990s (last updated Jan. 24,
2013).
2. Rod Paschall, Coding and Decoding, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 147, 146-47 (John Whiteclay Chambers II ed.,
2000).
3. See, e.g., FREDRIC A. GODSHALL ET AL., NASA, EXAMPLES OF THE
USEFULNESS OF SATELLITE DATA IN GENERAL ATMOSPHERIC CIRCULATION
RESEARCH 6 (1969).
4. See Michael Griffin, The Real Reasons We Explore Space, AIR & SPACE
MAGAZINE (July 2007), available at http://www.airspacemag.com/spaceexploration/Uncommentary.html?c=y&page=1.
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occurred nearly twice weekly.5 This trend has continued into the
twenty-first century with between fifty and ninety orbital
launches per year, and the occupation of space shows no signs of
diminishing.6
Beginning in the mid-1980s, it became clear that private use
of outer space would comprise an ever-growing component of
space activities.7 Private development spurred by legislation
aimed at allowing private use of space was slow at first, but is
now a sector of significant economic importance.8 The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) is committed to
using private sector launch vehicles to the maximum extent
practical.9 For example, a private sector launch vehicle delivered
cargo to the International Space Station in March 2013.10
Private usage of space is increasing, and its effects on the orbital
environment ought to be given serious consideration.
A direct effect of space usage in the past fifty years has been
the accumulation of tons of space debris, commonly referred to as
orbital debris or “space junk.”11 Space junk is composed of the
relics of past exploratory missions and civilian satellite
operations.12 Every time a rocket stage from a vehicle is depleted
or a capsule separates, pieces of the vehicle break off of the
assembly (by design) and are jettisoned into space with the
intention that they will remain in orbit indeterminately or return
to Earth via a calculated procedure to harmlessly burn up on

5. See Gunter Dirk Grebs, Chronology of Space Launches, GUNTER’S SPACE
PAGE, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/chronology.htm (last updated Dec. 27
2013).
6. See id.
7. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 2, 98 Stat. 3055
(1984) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.A. § 70101 et seq.).
8. See
Office
of
Commercial
Space
Transportation:
Recently
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
Completed/Historical
Launches,
FED.
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license/lice
nsed_launches/historical_launch/ (last modified Oct. 24, 2013, 1:24 PM).
9. 51 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(2) (2010).
10. See
Dragon
Delivers,
SPACEX.COM
(Mar.
3,
2013),
http://www.spacex.com/news/2013/03/03/happy-berth-day.
11. See
Orbital
Objects,
NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
http://science.nationalgeographic.co.uk/science/space/solar-system/orbital/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013).
12. Id.
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reentry into the atmosphere.13 Needless to say, with procedures
and machinery as complicated as those used in the space
industry, these intentions are not always realized.14
By current estimates there are that more than 21,000 pieces
of orbital debris larger than ten centimeters in diameter
surrounding the Earth, approximately 500,000 pieces between
one and ten centimeters in diameter, and more than 100 million
pieces smaller than one centimeter.15 Though Earth’s orbit is
concededly a large place, this debris poses a very serious danger
to the continued use of outer space.16 NASA’s greatest fear
regarding sustained occupation of space is a collision between an
occupied or operationally critical manmade object and a piece of
space debris.17 Not only does this have the potential to cripple
communications and even prevent the launch of future missions,
it may threaten the lives of astronauts through destruction of
their spacecraft.18
The current body of international law on space debris is
sparse, though still somewhat beneficial to the cause. The only
relevant international agreement regarding the phenomenon of
space debris concerns the assignments of liability in the event of
a celestial collision, or for objects falling from space and striking
the Earth.19 There are no binding international documents
concerning the control of space debris or the need to design
objects launched into space to minimize debris. Some countries
have recognized the threat of orbital debris and have unilaterally
implemented their own controls on prospective space activities
13. NASA, Orbital Debris Reentry, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE,
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/reentry/reentry.html (last updated Aug. 21,
2009).
14. See Orbital Objects, supra note 16.
15. NASA, Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS
PROGRAM OFFICE, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#3 (last updated
Mar. 2012).
16. See generally NASA, Another Debris Avoidance Maneuver for the ISS, 17
ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, no. 1, January 2013, at 3.
17. Id.
18. See Clara Moskowitz, Space Junk Problem is More Threatening Than
Ever,
Report
Warns,
SPACE
(Sep.
1,
2011,
11:01
AM),
http://www.space.com/12801-space-junk-threat-orbital-debris-report.html.
19. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter “Space
Liability Convention”].
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within their respective jurisdictions in order to slow the growth of
the threat.20 Some national and multinational space agencies
have even joined forces and created guideline statements
concerning space debris.21
One considerable drawback of these multilateral efforts to
curb the debris problem is that these guideline statements are
non-binding; potentially more problematic is the fact that the
existing self-adopted rules made pursuant to those guidelines
may be inapplicable to private sector launches.22 In order to
protect current space installations and ensure that outer space
may be utilized by posterity, it is essential that regulations be
developed which limit the amount, type, and size of space debris
that may be released in Earth’s orbit from private sector
activities.
In furtherance of this goal, this article will explain the
dynamics of the space environment, examine current space law
and its shortcomings both internationally and nationally, and
present reasoned resolutions to the issue at hand including the
use of petitions for action by United States government agencies
and the encouragement of legislative action. This article will also
address certain positive and negative aspects of adopting debrisregulating law. Above all, the United States government and the
American people should be made aware of the serious issues
concerning the continued use of space by the private sector, and
this article seeks to facilitate that conversation. Through this
awareness, the United States can address the current legal
deficiencies and provide an example of the focus that should be
given to space debris law.

20. NASA, Orbital Debris Mitigation, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM
OFFICE, http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/mitigate/mitigation.html (last updated
Jan. 8, 2013); e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 25.114(d)(14) (2014) (requiring applicants for
space station authorization to submit a statement on design and operation of
said space station for the purpose of mitigating orbital debris).
21. See Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee, IADC, http://www.iadconline.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
22. NASA & DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. GOVERNMENT ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION
STANDARD
PRACTICES
(1997),
available
at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/USG_OD_Standard_Practices.pdf;
NASA, supra note 24 (under the “Additional Information” header).
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BACKGROUND OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES
UNIQUE TO OUTER SPACE

In order to understand why space debris needs to be
regulated at all, the physical aspects of outer space, which
account for the danger of the debris, need to be understood. The
danger is a result of the combination of outer space’s lack of
gravity, the speeds at which objects in space are travelling in
orbit, and the lengthy presence of many space objects.23 It is
clear that the most notable characteristic of the outer space
environment is the lack of gravity. Aside from the appeal of
extraterrestrial perspective for monitoring and communications
purposes, the absence of gravity is among the central appeals of
exploring the near Earth environment. Taking advantage of this
feature, many experimental chemical processes and observations
are conducted which are only possible in low gravity.24
The characteristic effect of low gravity is that objects in
motion tend to stay in that motion; this is the central tenet of
Newton’s first law of motion, and the basis of orbital science.25
As a result, objects that are released in space tend to continue on
the trajectory of their release until acted upon by another force.26
The predominant “other” force in this equation is the gravity of
the Earth, which eventually corrals nearby objects and forces
them to fall into the atmosphere.27 This process may take
decades and, as a result, there are pieces of space junk floating in
Earth’s orbit dating back to the genesis of spaceflight with no
indication that they may soon collide with the atmosphere.28
Consequently, objects in space have a semi-persistent presence

23. Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris:
Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 51, 55 (1992).
24. See e.g., Lawrence J. DeLucas et al., Protein Crystal Growth in Space,
Past and Future, 237 J. OF CRYSTAL GROWTH 1646, 1646-1650 (2002); Andrei
Markin et al., The Dynamics of Blood Biochemical Parameters in Cosmonauts
During Long-Term Space Flights, 42 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 247, 247-253 (1998).
25. STEVEN HOLZNER, PHYSICS FOR DUMMIES 64-73 (2006) (explaining Isaac
Newton’s famous three laws of motion remedially).
26. Id.
27. See OLIVER MONTENBRUCK & EBERHARD GILL, SATELLITE ORBITS: MODELS,
METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS 2-4 (2000).
28. Id.; NASA & DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 27.
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and are thus liable to accumulate, rather than diminish, as space
activity goes on.
The other central characteristic of orbital space is the
extreme speed at which objects are travelling. In order to
maintain an orbit around the Earth, as persistent space objects
do, objects must be travelling at a tangential speed (with respect
to the Earth) sufficient to negate the force of Earth’s pull.29 This
speed varies depending on the distance of the orbit from Earth;
an object’s orbital speed in near Earth orbit is generally in excess
of 18,000 miles per hour, whereas an object in geostationary orbit
may travel in excess of 67,000 miles per hour.30 Therefore, any
collision of objects in space, even if only glancing, carries a high
risk of complete catastrophe for the objects involved. Some
objects have been documented colliding in space in recent years,
resulting in their complete destruction and the release of yet
more debris.31
Due to these unique aspects of space, there is a real danger of
a chain-reaction event known as “Kessler Syndrome.”32
Scientists fear that if a sufficient number of collisions occurs in
orbit, a run-away reaction may prevent future use of space.33
They theorize that when two space objects collide, that collision
will result in more pieces of space debris than were involved in
the original collision; those new fragments of debris would then
cause more collisions and so forth indefinitely.34 The end result
of such a reaction is the transformation of Earth’s orbital
environment into a minefield that is no longer safe for manned or
unmanned space activities; this would essentially trap mankind
on the Earth, severely limit our ability to study our planet, and
reduce our ability to communicate with each other.35 Outer space
physics create an extremely hostile environment, and necessitate
29. MONTENBRUCK, supra note 32.
30. See
Orbital
Speed,
FREEMARS,
http://www.freemars.org/jeff/speed/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (showing
orbital speed calculations and speed estimates for space objects at various
altitudes).
31. See NASA, Satellite Collision Leaves Significant Debris Clouds, 13
ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, no. 2, April 2009, at 1.
32. KESSLER ET AL., supra note 2.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 10.
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regulation in order to maximize the safety of current missions
and reduce the possibility of a reduction in spacefaring activities
in the future.
III.

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW

The current body of space law is largely implemented by
individual nations through their space agencies.36 Apart from
such
independent,
domestically-centered
regulations,
international agreements on the use of space are few in number
and lacking in substance. The first substantial contribution to
international space law was the “Outer Space Treaty”37 created in
1967 to address the growing concerns over mankind’s increasing,
multilateral use of outer space.38 This is the most influential
international agreement concerning space law, and among the
most widely ratified.39
Chief among the guiding principles of the Outer Space Treaty
are that space exploration be for the “benefit of all mankind” and
that international laws should govern activities in outer space.40
The Outer Space Treaty addresses liability assignment for space
activities by making clear that the nation responsible for the
launch retains ownership of and responsibility for the object.41
Consequently, any resulting conflict arising on account of the
activities of that object is attributable to the nation that launched
it.42 The treaty also states that party nations are to convene and
consult with one another in the event that one nation’s space
activities may endanger those of another nation or the peaceful
use of outer space as a whole.43 With the addition of more space
debris with every launch, it is now apparent that any launch has
the potential to endanger the space activities of another
spacefaring nation; while the immediate likelihood of such a
36. See IADC, supra note 25.
37. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”].
38. Id. pmbl.
39. See id. (signatories number over one hundred nations).
40. Id. art. I, III., supra note 42.
41. Id. art. VII.
42. Id. art. VI-VIII.
43. Outer Space Treaty at art. IX.
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collision is slim, there is recognition of the growing danger.44 It
logically follows that nations participating in the Outer Space
Treaty are compelled to resolve the issue of how to minimize the
likelihood of an orbital collision and the theorized run-away chain
reaction.45
In 1972, and in furtherance of the controlled exploration of
outer space, the United Nations General Assembly presented a
treaty colloquially called the “Space Liability Convention.”46
Article III of this convention provided that when two objects
collided, whatever party is at fault is liable for damages resulting
from the collision.47 The most significant limitation of this treaty
is that it would only apply to situations where fault could be
determined. Because many pieces of space debris are no larger
than a bolt or screw (and in most cases much smaller) it is
relatively impossible to assign liability and causation.48 To
further complicate the assignment of liability, much debris is not
catalogued, the launching state is often unsure whether it has
released debris, debris is difficult to track, and existing debris
may be decades old.49 Thus, the problem of liability is complex.
At least for liability, there are situations where no redress is
feasible due to one or more of these complications; in such
situations, a precautionary/remedial approach to debris control is
warranted.50
In order to fulfill the limited purposes of the Space Liability
Convention, a proper registry of space activities was necessary.

44. See.supra, Part II.
45. See generally Outer Space Treaty (Although this problem is not
specifically addressed in the Outer Space Treaty, it is a logical outgrowth of the
treaty’s application that the problem be confronted).
46. See generally Space Liability Convention, supra note 23.
47. Id.
48. See supra, Part II.
49. Debris is tracked through observation efforts on the ground, while
agencies like NASA are conscious that their craft may release a certain amount
of debris, total omniscience as to what piece came from which craft when is
infeasible to determine. See NASA, supra note 19.
50. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). (The global issue of carbon
dioxide contributions resulting in climate change was recognized; while it was
generally known from where much of the gas came, the effects of the releases
had not yet been realized and liability was not assigned. Knowledge of the
potential and inevitable effects of releasing carbon dioxide justified imposing
rules for limitation on that release).
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In 1974, the United Nations opened a treaty for signature to
address this concern, the Convention on Registration of Launched
Objects into Outer Space (Registration Convention).51 The treaty
required that any “space object” or its component parts that are
intended to travel into outer space be registered with the
Secretary General of the United Nations.52
However, the
convention failed to take into account the incidental expulsion of
objects into space, a significant contributing factor to the problem
of orbital debris.53 While it is clear that a habitation capsule or
the booster stage of a rocket would qualify as a “space object,” it is
impractical or impossible to register a loose rivet or an insulation
foam shard incidental to the separation of vehicles, especially if
the releases are unknown. While the Registration Convention
does provide a list of possible sources of space debris, it has no
provisions that explicitly or implicitly limit the release of small
and incidental debris objects into orbit.
The foregoing treaties are low on substantive solutions for
the present problem, mainly because they are non-self-executing,
were created with domestic implementation in mind, and do not
address all of the complexities of spacefaring activities.
Nonetheless, these treaties have been ratified by all major
participants in outer space utilization.54
While they have
addressed some of the concerns related to orbital debris, the
domestic implementation of the agreements has resulted in
incomplete regulation of orbital debris, especially in the United
States.
IV.

UNITED STATES’ REGULATION OF ORBITAL
DEBRIS

Outer space is an international environment that requires
multilateral cooperation in order to secure its utility and
51. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov.
12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter “Registration
Convention”].
52. Id. art. I, II.
53. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 18 (1990).
54. See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal
Subcomm, Rep. on its 52nd Sess., Apr. 8-Apr. 19, 2013, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2013/CRP.5
(Mar.
28,
2013)
available
at
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2013_CRP05E.pdf.
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preservation.
This can only be achieved by improving
implementation of international agreements at the national
level.55
While there is no barrier to nations creating
supplementary bilateral or multilateral treaties to implement
major international agreements, it is more practical for a nation
to address the particulars of its own spacefaring activities and
create domestically binding regulations, as the United States has.
In addition to United Nations treaties, domestic regulations may
be inspired by alternative international guidance and
cooperation. Several nations have taken the initiative, through
their respective space agencies, to promulgate cooperative nonbinding guidelines addressing mitigation of space debris.56
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(“IADC”) worked with several space agencies to create the most
comprehensive and influential guidelines on the subject.57 The
guidelines’ most pertinent provisions require a participating
agency to limit space debris release during normal operations to
the extent feasible, to dispose of potential orbital debris after the
conclusion of a mission, and to plan missions with the express
purpose of minimizing the possibility of orbital collisions.58 Each
space agency is therefore responsible for implementing these
practices. Recognizing the urgency of the space debris problem,
President Barack Obama issued a statement revising United
States space policy with specific emphasis on the preservation of
the orbital environment in keeping with the spirit of the IADC
guidelines as well as previous international agreements.59
Congress has likewise taken initiative and incorporated the
principles of the IADC guidelines and the new executive policy
55. See generally Space Liability Convention supra note 23, see also Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 41.
56. IADC, supra note 25 (showing that international guidelines for the
mitigation of space debris have been agreed upon by space agencies from: Italy,
France, China, Canada, Germany, the European Union, India, Japan, the
United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom); see IADC, IADC
SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.iadconline.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub.
57. IADC, SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION GUIDELINES (Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub.
58. Id. § 5.
59. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (June 28,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.
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into its latest authorizing statute for NASA in 2010, and NASA
has in turn incorporated the guidelines into its regulations for the
governance of its space activities.60
Unfortunately, existing United States law regarding space
debris is not comprehensive with respect to all United States
space activities. While the United States has taken appreciable
steps toward limiting the country’s contribution to the orbital
debris problem, the guidelines and agency regulations apply
primarily to government activities and are silent, inapplicable, or
avoidable as to the space activities of the private sector.
Consequently, there is no legally binding regulation on the
private sector forcing it to reduce its release of certain debris into
orbit.
As it stands, the private sector is poised to expand its current
operations in Earth’s orbit and eventually assume many
historically governmental aspects of space activity.61 NASA has
planned for this expansion to a limited extent and has committed
to utilizing private sector launch vehicles and technology to the
extent practical.62 NASA, however, is not the governing agency
that licenses and regulates the launch of private sector space
objects; that duty falls on the Department of Transportation
through the Federal Aviation Administration, specifically the
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (“AST”).63 AST was
established to regulate and promote commercial space
transportation, recommend regulatory changes to commercial
space transportation laws, and bolster the United States’ space

60. See 51 U.S.C. §§ 10101-71302 (2012); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1200-1299 (2013);
NASA, NASA TECHNICAL STANDARD 8719.14A: PROCESS FOR LIMITING ORBITAL
DEBRIS
(2012),
available
at
https://standards.nasa.gov/documents/detail/3315680.
61. See Adam Mann, The Year’s Most Audacious Private Space Plans,
(Dec.
27,
2012,
6:30AM),
WIRED.COM
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/12/audacious-space-companies-2012/;
see also Emi Kolawole, NASA Awards Multi-Million Dollar Contracts to Boeing
SpaceX and Sierra Nevada for Human Spaceflight, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/nasa-awardsmultimillion-dollar-contracts-to-boeing-spacex-and-sierra-nevada-for-humanspaceflight/2012/08/03/a40938c0-dd89-11e1-af1d-753c613ff6d8_blog.html.
62. 51 U.S.C. § 20301(b)(2) (2012).
63. FAA, OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION: ABOUT THE OFFICE,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/about/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2013).
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transportation infrastructure.64 Although operating in the same
field as NASA, AST differs significantly in that it regulates
private entities. This difference may explain the disparity in
regulations between private and government projects.
Entry into outer space by commercial entities is not a new
phenomenon; it was anticipated and lauded by President Reagan
and the 98th Congress.65 The Commercial Space Launch Act,
enacted in 1984, not only created AST and the licensing
procedures and requirements for private sector space activities,
but it also included a purposive provision that suggested a major
difference between the private and public sector space industries:
the promotion of economic growth.66 While NASA is a participant
in the economic exploitation of space,67 private space companies
are able to more easily profit from space due to their efficiency.68
It is reasonable to think that the Congress, in enacting the
Commercial Space Launch Act, was more interested in spurring
the national economy and broadening American companies’
extraterrestrial participation than protecting space orbits from
debris incidental to private sector launches.69 Forcing a private
sector business to implement controls on debris would be costly,
and in an industry with such a high monetary barrier70 to entry
as space exploration, every penny counts.
However, the
Commercial Space Launch Act was passed with the 1980’s
private sector environment in mind – that is, it was concerned
with growing the private space industry. Now that the industry
has developed, the Commercial Space Launch Act is outdated.

64. Id.
65. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984).
66. Id. § 3(1).
67. Stephen J. Dubner, Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics
Quorum,
FREAKONOMICS.COM
(Jan.
11,
2008),
http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-afreakonomics-quorum/ (quoting G. Scott Hubbard, former director of the NASA
Ames Research Center, “It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space
program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit.”).
68. Phoenix McLaughlin, SpaceX Spends 320 Times Less on Building the
Dragon Than NASA Does on the Orion, POLICYMIC (July 2012),
http://www.policymic.com/articles/11354/spacex-spends-320-times-less-onbuilding-the-dragon-than-nasa-does-on-the-orion.
69. S. REP. NO. 98-656 at *6 (1984).
70. See Why the US Can Beat China: The Facts About SpaceX Costs,
SPACEREF (May 4, 2011), http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=33457.
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AST’s licensing power is not entirely toothless regarding
regulation of orbital debris. The Secretary of Transportation has
the authority to impose restrictions, such as debris regulation, on
a license applicant upon issuance of the license.71 This restrictive
power has yet to be exercised by AST, but AST’s treatment of the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) sheds light on how
these restrictions may be imposed.72
As it currently stands, AST does not require consideration of
the effects of debris on much of the orbital environment in order
to comply with NEPA.73 When preparing an application for
licensing under the Commercial Space Launch Act, an applicant
is encouraged to submit, along with the required application
information, sufficient information concerning the environmental
effects of the project such that the Secretary of Transportation
can determine whether an Environmental Impact Statement is
necessary in order to comply with NEPA.74 The guidance
document for this process requires a discussion of the
atmospheric impact of orbital debris.75 Any atmospheric impact
to be considered by AST in an environmental assessment is
limited to those impacts felt in the ionosphere, which has a
maximum ceiling of roughly 960 kilometers.76 Distinctly absent
from the guidance document is any requirement for consideration
of orbital debris77 above 960 kilometers, a region which contains
hundreds of satellites.78
It appears that the Council on
71. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(2) (2012).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2013); 14 C.F.R. §
413.7 (2013); see AST, GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW STATUTES FOR
THE LICENSING OF COMMERCIAL LAUNCHES AND LAUNCH SITES (2001), available at
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/licenses_permits/m
edia/epa5dks.pdf [hereinafter “AST NEPA GUIDELINES”].
74. Id.
75. AST NEPA Guidelines, at App.. D (VII)(2).
76. AST NEPA Guidelines at 21; Rani C. Gran & Laura Layton, Space Has
Never Been Closer: NASA Instruments Document Contraction of the Boundary
between
the
Earth’s
Ionosphere
and
Space,
NASA,
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/outer_atmosphere.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2014).
77. For the purposes of succinctness, “orbital debris” as referenced in this
article shall refer to that debris which is beyond the ionosphere.
78. List of Satellites in Geostationary Orbit, SATELLITE SIGNALS,
http://www.satsig.net/sslist.htm (last updated Feb. 21, 2014).
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Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), the administrator of NEPA, and
the AST have never considered the orbital surroundings of Earth
beyond the ionosphere to be subject to NEPA.79
Additionally, NEPA’s application to the area beyond the
ionosphere is subject to two limitations. First, NEPA is only
applicable to major federal actions which have the potential to
significantly affect the “human environment.”80 Second, NEPA’s
extraterritorial application must be considered. This second issue
was presented under similar factual circumstances in
Environmental
Defense
Fund
v.
Massey,
concerning
extraterritorial application of NEPA in the “sovereignless”
territory of Antarctica.81 Among other considerations, the court
held that when applying NEPA where all major decisions are
made in United States territory and where conflict with another
sovereign’s law is not present, the presumption against
extraterritoriality of a statute is inapplicable.82 Concerning
licensing private space launches, all licensing decisions are made
domestically, and there is likewise no definite sovereign over the
subject territory of outer space. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude that upon a determination that orbital debris
significantly affects the “human environment,” NEPA’s
Environmental Impact Statement requirements should apply.
Even if orbital debris were to be considered in an
Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to NEPA and an AST
licensing procedure, there would still be no guarantee of
substantive environmental protection from NEPA. NEPA is
simply a procedural statute and does not force an agency to
impose any measure of environmental protection so long as there

79. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (There is no explicit or implicit intention in
the statute for orbital space beyond the ionosphere to be considered an
“environment,” but there is no preclusion of the Council on Environmental
Quality on making that interpretation. Thus far there has been no action taken
at any level in furtherance of making that interpretation, suggesting that it
would be a novel legal issue to the agency.).
80. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(c) (2012). A discussion of the unregulated zone beyond
the ionosphere affecting the “human environment” appears below in Part V.
81. See Envt’l Def. Fund. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
82. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss3/7

14

2014]

ONE GIANT HEAP FOR MANKIND

871

has been an adequate identification and evaluation of the
environmental impact of the action.83
Environmental protection against orbital debris currently
exercised by AST has the potential to be inapplicable under a new
administration. Since AST, an Executive agency under the
Department of Transportation, adheres to President Obama’s
National Space Policy of the United States of America,84 it must
create its own orbital debris reduction procedures as NASA did.85
However, this adherence is not required by the current version of
the Commercial Space Launch Act, only by Executive policy.86 If
Executive policy were to change, by a change of the
administration for example, the Secretary of Transportation
could, under the Commercial Space Launch Act, waive any
requirement pursuant to issuance of a license, even the need for a
license itself, if he finds that such a waiver is in the public
interest and will not jeopardize public health or safety, safety of
property, and national security and foreign policy interests,
unless a human is on board.87 Consequently, President Obama’s
National Space Policy document does not offer the kind of
permanent protection which would survive a change in
administration.
Whether the Secretary would consider the addition of debris
from a launch a danger is unclear. While the policy statement by
the President recognizes the need to limit orbital debris for the
sustainable use of the orbital environment, neither the President
nor any relevant Executive agency has gone so far as to qualify
any single, specific addition of debris as dangerous.88 This
interpretation is consistent with a preference for economic

83. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
84. WHITE HOUSE, NAT’L SPACE POLICY OF THE U.S. (June 28, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.
85. See generally FAA, Office of Commercial Space Transportation:
Legislation
and
Policies, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/legislation_policies/
(last modified Sept. 10, 2013).
86. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(3) (2011).
87. Id.
88. See generally NAT’L SPACE POLICY , supra note 88.
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development of space, reminiscent of the Reagan era, as opposed
to a concern for the safety of the space environment.
It may also be argued that existing United States space law
policies would adequately regulate private sector orbital debris.
However, this argument is potentially flawed. United States
governmental agencies, such as NASA and the Department of
Transportation, rely heavily on the “U.S. Government Orbital
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,” a document meant to
guide agencies in creating regulations which restrict orbital
debris89 This document, developed by NASA and adopted by all
United States government agencies by 2001, included meaningful
purposive and practical mandates for the limitation and
reduction of debris in Earth orbit.90 Although the document itself
purports to apply to “all operational orbit regimes” these
guidelines have questionable application to private sector space
activities.91 The document is silent on which entities are to be
regulated, and an external governmental description of the
policy’s applicability speaks only of “government operated or
procured space systems.”92 Whether issuance of a license
amounts to government operation or procurement of a private
sector space system is unclear. Thus, the current United States
Standard Practices document is potentially inapplicable to the
private sector.
Even assuming that the Standard Practices document is
applicable to the private sector, there is a glaring fault which has
the potential to allow the release of copious amounts of orbital
debris. The document does specify that spacecraft should be
designed to minimize the release of debris; however, debris under
five millimeters in any dimension is allowed to be jettisoned with
no restriction, and debris larger than five millimeters may be
jettisoned pending evaluation of cost effectiveness and mission
requirements.93 The second situation gives no attention to the
environmental considerations attendant to release of orbital
89. See generally NASA & DEP’T OF DEF., U.S. GOV’T ORBITAL DEBRIS
MITIGATION
STANDARD
PRACTICES
(1997),
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/USG_OD_Standard_Practices.pdf.
90. See id.; NASA, supra note 24 (under the “Additional Information”
header).
91. See ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93.
92. Id.
93. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93.
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debris and no guidance on what is cost effective or required by a
mission.
The Standard Practices document provides little
assurance that orbital debris is effectively minimized.
To summarize, the regulatory body of law on private sector
additions of orbital debris falls short. International treaties bind
countries to use space for peaceful purposes and to allow for space
exploitation for the benefit of the human race; domestic space
agencies have followed the essence of these treaties, but fall short
of effective regulation of the private sector.94 The IADC provided
guidelines to government agencies which, upon their adoption,
became binding on the agencies, but not necessarily private space
operations.95 Congress, through its failure to address the private
sector space industry in the latest NASA authorization statute
and its effective exemption of private companies from
environmental considerations in the Commercial Space Launch
Act, has left the private sector, perhaps intentionally,
environmentally unregulated.96 The Secretary of Transportation
may impose restrictions, such as an environmental restriction
upon the grant of a license, but there is no requirement that he do
so; even if there were, the Secretary may waive that
requirement.97
As a consequence, the only environmental
protections against private sector orbital debris come from an
Executive policy which is subject to change following a change in
administration.98 AST also fails to consider the effects of orbital
debris released beyond the ionosphere when reviewing a license
applicant’s environmental assessment.99 Additionally, NEPA
fails to provide any substantive protection to the orbital
environment as it is only a procedural statute. 100 If applicable,
perhaps the most protective is the U.S. Government Orbital
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, which allows for
widespread addition of debris below a certain size and also
addition of larger debris pending evaluation of non-environmental

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See supra, Part III.
See supra, Part IV.
51 U.S.C. §§ 10101-71302 (2010).
51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(2)-(3) (2011).
AST NEPA Guidelines at Appx. D (VII)(2)(a)(5).
AST NEPA Guidelines at 21.
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see also supra, Part IV.
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factors.101 At best, regulation of orbital debris from private sector
space launches depends on whether the Secretary sees fit to
impose protective requirements; at worst, there is essentially no
effective regulation of orbital debris for private sector space
activities.
Interestingly, we find another approach to orbital debris
mitigation in United States law, one that is not based on private
or public identity, but on use. This approach is implemented by
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which
requires that any proposed communications satellite must
include in its license application a plan for reduction of debris
including disposal of the satellite after expiration of its useful
life.102 Nevertheless, the regulation falls short in that it only
applies to communications satellites.103 Given the limited scope
of the FCC regulatory sphere, the regulation does not provide a
proper platform upon which to base the industry-wide protection
required to solve the problem of orbital debris.
V.

REVISING THE CURRENT BODY OF UNITED
STATES SPACE LAW

There are several routes that a revision of the current body of
United States space law may take that would allow greater
controls on the private sector’s contribution to orbital debris. In
order to mitigate debris not subject to IADC-derivative
regulation, there must be an assurance that agencies, such as
AST, will create legally binding rules on orbital debris for private
companies, or at the very least ensure that procedural provisions
such as NEPA apply to private activities in the region beyond the
ionosphere.
First, the regulation of private space debris should be based
on either a comprehensive agency rule or federal statute with
clear standards controlling the discretion of the Secretary of
Transportation to either impose certain restrictions or waive
them. Of those two choices, an agency rule is the more practical
approach. If upon its own volition, the agency does not
undertake rulemaking, then members of the public might petition
101. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93.
102. See e.g. 47 C.F.R. § 5.64 (2012).
103. Id.
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for a rule. The Commercial Space Launch Act does not include a
provision for the public to petition for the issuance of a rule;
however, the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), which
applicable to administrative procedures, does allow for petition by
interested persons.104 Who qualifies as an interested party in
such situations can be complicated. A member of the regulated
community would certainly meet the legal requirements,
although such an entity might be unlikely to seek regulation.
Petitions might more likely come from cell phone users or
satellite television users, who receive benefits from an
uncluttered space environment, particularly the uninterrupted
use of satellites and the benefits of space innovations. Whether
they would qualify as interested parties under the APA would
depend on the specific facts of the case.
Alternatively, Congress might amend the Commercial Space
Launch Act to more stringently regulate private space debris and
to require that environmental impact analyses include evaluation
of space debris generated by the activity.
Concerning
environmental assessment, there is currently nothing in NEPA,
the Commercial Space Launch Act, Council on Environmental
Quality regulations, or Department of Transportation regulations
classifying space beyond the ionosphere as a “human
environment” that would require an environmental impact
assessment on a proposed federal action, such as the grant of a
license. Despite this lack of such a classification, the region
beyond the ionosphere may still be subject to an environmental
impact assessment under NEPA due to the fact that it does
significantly affect the “human environment” which lies beneath
it.105
Low Earth orbit can reasonably be interpreted as a “human
environment” under NEPA based on the broad scope of the term
“environment.”
The provision in NEPA concerning “major
Federal actions affecting the quality of the human environment”
is meant to be broadly interpreted and strictly imposed.106 For
example, “‘[e]nvironment’ means something more than rocks,
104. 51 U.S.C. §§ 50901-50923 (2011); 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (c) (2012).
106. Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 390 F. Supp. 579, 591
(E.D. La. 1974) (referencing Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

19

876

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

trees, and streams, or the amount of air pollution[;] [i]t
encompasses all the factors that affect the quality of life:
crowding, squalor, and crime are obviously adverse
environmental factors.”107 This interpretation suggests that
when a major United States federal action could have significant
impact on an area with a human presence, NEPA may be
applicable.108 It then follows that low Earth orbit can be
considered a “human environment” given that it has had and
continues to have a human presence.109 Orbital debris beyond
the ionosphere does inevitably fall from its high altitude to the
occupied region below it.
The low Earth orbit “human
environment” is thus clearly affected by debris released in regions
beyond the ionosphere. Consequently, NEPA’s environmental
impact analysis should consider debris releases beyond the
ionosphere.
Space beyond the ionosphere may be interpreted as a NEPAprotected environment in its own right in that its continued use
“stimulate[s] the health and welfare of man . . . .”110 The benefits
to mankind in keeping space exploration uninhibited are
innumerable.
As previously mentioned, there are medical
breakthroughs and scientific discoveries that only could have
been made in orbit.111 Likewise, the contribution to mankind’s
understanding of the Earth has resulted in substantial benefit
and terrestrial technological advancement.112 The continued
exploration of space beyond the ionosphere can only serve to
benefit the health and welfare of mankind.
Upon further examination of NEPA’s purposive language,
space beyond the ionosphere can reasonably be interpreted as an
environment in the sense that it may produce resources
important to the United States. One of NEPA’s purposes is to
107. Jones, 390 F. Supp. at 591 (alteration in original).
108. See id.
109. See
International
Space
Station,
NASA,
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/expeditions/index.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2013) (showing a cumulative crew time on the International Space
Station alone in excess of 4,500 days).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).
111. DELUCAS ET AL., supra note 28, at 1647; MARKIN ET AL., supra note 28, at
247.
112. See Benefits of Space Exploration, NASA HEADQUARTERS LIBRARY (Nov.
2010), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/hqlibrary/pathfinders/spinoff.htm.
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“enrich the understanding of . . . natural resources important to
the Nation.”113 A planned purpose of future space missions is
harvesting natural resources present in asteroids and other small
celestial bodies.114 The harvest and exploitation of celestial
compounds can only exist when access to such bodies is
unimpeded by the dangers of a Kessler-type debris cloud. Since
this potential boon of natural resources remains largely
untouched or undiscovered, it would be pertinent for NEPA to
encompass activities in regions that might limit mankind’s ability
to formulate an understanding of and explore those resources.
The region beyond the ionosphere has thus far not been
considered in AST’s licensing procedures despite the preceding
arguments that NEPA ought to apply. AST should starting
taking a hard look at significant environmental impacts that
result from its licensing. To include significant impacts in space
as “environmental” impacts, revisions could be made to NEPA or
regulations that interpret NEPA. Revision of NEPA, to require
environmental impact analysis for debris released beyond the
ionosphere, is neither necessary nor wise, since lobbying to
amend a statute concerning environmental protection may open
that statute to less environmentally friendly modifications.
Amendment of the Council of Environmental Quality’s NEPA
regulations would be adequate to make orbital debris releases
beyond the ionosphere a consideration in environmental impact
analyses. Alternatively, petition could be made for an AST
regulation requiring such consideration in environmental
assessments, or a petition could be made to directly require
private license applicants to provide protections more stringent
than those in the U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation
Standard Practices.
Interpreting space beyond the ionosphere as affecting the
human-occupied region beneath it, or as an environment in its
113. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
114. Cecilia Jamasmie, Asteroid Mining to Dominate the Industry: Experts,
MINING.COM (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.mining.com/asteroid-mining-todominate-the-industry-experts-69016/; Staff Writers, Stott Space Aims to Mine
Asteroids
this
Decade,
SPACEDAILY.COM
(Mar.
1,
2013),
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Stott_Space_Aims_to_Mine_Asteroids_this_D
ecade_999.html; Asteroid Mining Plans Announced, HAZARDEX (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://www.hazardexonthenet.net/article/56880/Asteroid-mining-plansannounced.aspx.
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own right, would allow for additional procedures and potential
protections. Through the inclusion of the preceding concepts in
American space regulation, the United States can set an example
for intolerance of space debris which may be imitated worldwide
to a beneficial effect.
VI.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NATIONAL DEBRIS
REGULATION ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The private sector would understandably resist the
imposition of a rule regulating the release of orbital debris beyond
the ionosphere and even the consideration of such orbital debris
in an environmental impact analysis. Assuming that some control
does in fact occur through a scenario explored by this article, the
impact on private launches would be largely predictable.
With a focus on debris reduction, companies would be
compelled to invest in new research, engineering, and launch
strategies in order to be granted a license to operate. While this
would be a significant economic hurdle for companies wishing to
enter the market, the greatest mitigation of future dangers could
be better achieved at the infancy stages of private sector
participation.
As it stands, there are only seven private
companies licensed to launch spacecraft.115
Proactively
addressing this problem could drastically reduce economic impact
on the private sector if implemented now, rather than when there
are substantially more licensees.
Private space companies are not struggling either. Space is a
lucrative business and, as private companies contribute more to
the development of space technologies, the industry as a whole is
ripe to expand and reduce its relative costs.116 Arguably, such
expansion was the main impetus in passing the Commercial
Space Launch Act in the first place. It is apparent with the
growth of the private sector that economic considerations can no
longer be the only source of regulatory inspiration; a

115. Launch Data and Information: Active Licenses, FED.AVIATION ADMIN.,
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/launch_license/acti
ve_licenses/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
116. See Keep on Truckin’: A Private Company Heads for the International
Space
Station,
ECONOMIST
(May
5,
2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21554170; see, e.g., SPACEREF, supra note 74.
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consideration on the environmental impacts on outer space is also
warranted.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The use of outer space for human exploration and
exploitation has been ongoing and expanding for more than half a
century.117 At first there was only government participation in
space use,118 and international agreements provided an outline of
uses and purposes for which space ought to be utilized.119
Subsequent adoption of international agreements provided the
guidance necessary to preserve space for the benefit of all
mankind.120 Unfortunately, those provisions were shortsighted
or intentionally not all-inclusive.
At least in the case of the United States, regulation of space
debris beyond the ionosphere may currently be inapplicable to
private sector space participants.121
Private sector space
activities are governed by a separate set of rules than public
sector space activities and administered by a different agency
altogether, making NASA’s policy statements and guidelines
concerning space debris inapplicable.122
The Secretary of
Transportation, the person in charge of commercial space access,
is not bound to require a mitigation of orbital debris in his
consideration of private space launch licensing applications
beyond what is required in the U.S. Government Orbital Debris
Mitigation Guidelines.123 These guidelines provide inadequate
protection because they do not concern materials below five
millimeters, and for materials above that threshold, release may
be allowed without an environmental consideration.124 As a
result, the private space industry has the potential to pollute the
117. See Gunter Dirk Grebs, Chronology of Space Launches, GUNTER’S SPACE
PAGE, http://space.skyrocket.de/directories/chronology.htm (last updated Dec. 9,
2012).
118. See id.
119. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 41, Space Liability
Convention, supra note 23, Registration Convention, supra note 55.
120. See generally 51 U.S.C. §§10101-71302 (2012).
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. AST NEPA Guidelines, supra note 79 app.D(VII)(2)(a)(5); ORBITAL DEBRIS
MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93.
124. ORBITAL DEBRIS MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES, supra note 93.
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upper orbital environment of Earth with impunity unless the
Secretary specifically assigns additional restrictions on the
license.
The Secretary also has the power to waive any
restriction on a license given a finding of public benefit and the
lack of a finding of danger.125 Thus far, there is no indication
that the addition of orbital debris has been regarded as a danger
which might discourage the Secretary from granting a waiver.
Under current industry and agency practice, addition of
orbital debris above the ionosphere is not considered in a NEPArequired environmental impact analysis.126 NEPA arguably
should be applicable to this region because the addition of debris
in orbit significantly affects the “human environment.”127
Alternatively, the region beyond the ionosphere can be
interpreted as an environment subject to NEPA in its own right,
because it would “stimulate[] the health and welfare of man,” and
“enrich the understanding of . . . natural resources important to
the Nation.”128 A revision of agency regulations is recommended
to reinforce NEPA’s application to the release of debris beyond
the ionosphere.
It was Congress’ intention when it passed the Commercial
Space Launch Act to reduce as much as possible the barriers to
entry into such an expensive industry.129 The motivations
present for the original legislation are now outdated given the
fact that private space companies are having little trouble
gaining footholds in the space industry and profiting.130 The lack
of regulation on orbital debris has the potential to render orbit
around Earth inaccessible, unusable, reduce mankind’s ability to

125. 51 U.S.C. § 50905(b)(3) (2012).
126. See e.g. FAA, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR PEGASUS LAUNCHES AT
U.S. ARMY KWAJAELIN ATOLL RONALD REAGAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TEST
SITE.
(2009)
available
at
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/2009%20EA
%20for%20Pegasus%20LLO%20Renewal%20USAKA.pdf.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2012).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 4321(2012).
129. See Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055
(1984) (current version at 51 U.S.C. § 50901 (West 2010)).
130. See Ricardo Bilton, SpaceX’s Worth Skyrockets to $4.8B after Successful
(June
7,
2012),
Mission,VENTUREBEAT.COM
http://venturebeat.com/2012/06/07/privco-spacexs-worth-skyrockets-to-4-8billion-after-successful-mission/.
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transmit information and make scientific innovations, and could
essentially trap humanity on Earth.131
The solution to excess debris is regulation of entrants into
the extraterrestrial environment. Congress could amend the
Commercial Space Launch Act with a specific requirement that
private sector space activities must consider and mitigate their
contribution to orbital debris beyond the ionosphere.
Alternatively and somewhat more feasibly, interested persons
should petition the Council on Environmental Quality, the
Department of Transportation, or AST, to issue a regulation
conditioning the grant of a license on the incorporation of an
orbital debris mitigation program for releases beyond the
ionosphere.
An alternative approach, which offers only procedural
protection, would be a petition to the Council on Environmental
Quality, the Department of Transportation, or AST, to recognize
that the space beyond the ionosphere affects the “human
environment” and should therefore be considered in an
environmental impact analysis. Though procedural protection
from NEPA would not require any actual regulation of debris, it
would at least provide an additional procedural step which allows
the contemplation of the issue.132
The current regulation of private sector space activities is in
need of updating to cope with the realities of space economics and
the very real dangers of unregulated and expanding usage of
space by private companies. Short of notice and comment origin
to such regulations, petitioning for issuance of a rule is the most
apt alternative for producing the desired effect.
Through
implementation of private space activities controls, the United
States can provide an effective international model in furtherance
of the goal of the mitigation of space debris.

131. KESSLER ET AL., supra note 2.
132. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); see also Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980).
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